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A B S T R A C T . Maximilien Robespierre was deposed on  July / Thermidor Year II when the
charge that he was a tyrant burst spectacularly into open political discussion in France. This article
examines key aspects of how that charge had developed, and been discussed in veiled terms, over the
preceding months. First, it analyses a war of words which unfolded between Robespierre and the duke
of York, the commander of the British forces on the northern front. This involved allegations that
Robespierre had used an assassination attempt against him in late May as a pretext for scapegoating
the British – including the orchestration of a notorious government decree of  Prairial/ May
 which banned the taking of British and Hanoverian prisoners of war. Second, the article
explores how these developments ﬁtted within a larger view of Robespierre as aiming for supreme
power. In particular, they meshed closely with a reading of French politics which likened
Robespierre to the ancient Athenian leader Pisistratus, a ﬁgure who had subverted the city’s consti-
tution – including posing as a victim of violent attacks – in order to establish his tyranny.
Pisistratus’s story, we argue, offered a powerful script for interpreting Robespierre’s actions, and a
cue for resistance.
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The example of Pisistratus is already in everyone’s minds.
These words appeared in a British intelligence brieﬁng, based on a spy report
from Paris, dated  May . This was at the height of the Terror, some
two months before the overthrow of Robespierre on  July (or  Thermidor
Year II), following assassination attempts made on – May by two obscure
ﬁgures, Henri Admiral and Cécile Renault, on the lives of Collot d’Herbois
and Robespierre, both key members of the Committee of Public Safety (CPS)
then governing France. The report claimed to encapsulate the capital’s political
mood. More than a year later, the erstwhile Jacobin radical Xavier Audouin
would make the same association. Following his discussion of the Cécile
Renault assassination attempt, ‘Modern Pisistratus!’, he exclaimed of
Robespierre: ‘He made himself interesting by recounting the dangers that
threatened him.’
The Athenian tyrant Pisistratus is not a ﬁgure much mentioned by historians
of the French Revolutionary Terror. Yet as these references suggest, at that
moment his was a name to conjure with, and in this article we seek to under-
stand why. We do so by exploring the entangled connections linking his
name with that of Robespierre and, through an unlikely thread evident in a
vicious war of words, with that of the duke of York, the commander of British
armed forces ﬁghting against France on the northern front. This enables us
to bring into conjunction two apparently distinct developments: ﬁrst, the
polemic between Robespierre and York following the French government’s
notorious decision on  Prairial/ May  to take no British and
Hanoverian prisoners of war; second, how that polemic spilled into wider
debates in Paris centred around the ﬁgure of Pisistratus, debates which allow
us to track growing opposition to Robespierre on the charge of tyranny. It
will be helpful, in other words, better to understand why at this critical
moment in the Terror, Pisistratus was ‘in everyone’s minds’.
I
The penchant of Revolutionary statesmen to cite ancient history as guide and
reference for their own doings is widely acknowledged. As Marx noted in his
The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (), ‘the revolution of –
 draped itself alternately as Roman Republic and Roman Empire’. But
 The National Archives (TNA), FO /, report titled ‘De la frontière’,  May .
 It may have been compiled at a moment between news of the two assassination attempts.
 Xavier Audouin, L’Intérieur des maisons d’arrêts (Paris, ), p. . The document is dated
 Fructidor An  [ Aug. ].
 Karl Marx, Later political writings, ed. Terrell Carver (Cambridge, ), p. . On classics
and the French Revolution, see Harold T. Parker, The cult of antiquity and the French
Revolutionaries (Chicago, IL, ); Jacques Bouineau, Les toges du pouvoir: ou la Révolution du
droit antique (Toulouse, ); Claude Mossé, L’Antiquité dans la Révolution française (Paris,
); P. Vidal-Naquet, ‘Tradition de la démocratie grecque’, introduction to Moses Finlay,
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Ancient Greece was not forgotten. Indeed, Plutarch’s Parallel lives, ubiquitous
eighteenth-century school text for the Revolutionary generation, was structured
around Romano-Greek comparisons. Plutarch told the story of Pisistratus and
faction-ﬁghts in  BCE against Solon, the great Athenian lawgiver. Pisistratus
was an aristocrat who represented the city’s poorer inhabitants in the grouping
known as the Hill Dwellers (who opposed the Men of the Plains and the Men of
the Coast), and he seized power by trickery. Plutarch drew heavily on
Herodotus’s earlier account:
Wounding himself and his mules, he drove his carriage into the market place with a
tale that he had escaped from his enemies, who would have slain him (so he said)…
So he besought the people that he might have a guard…Thus deceived, the
Athenian people gave him a chosen guard of citizens, of whom Pisistratus made
not spearmen but clubmen[.]
Pisistratus subsequently used this force to seize the acropolis and, brushing aside
constitutional niceties, to establish himself in power.
There were worse rulers in ancient history than Pisistratus – he created public
works, sponsored the arts, established public festivals, and championed the
city’s poorer inhabitants. But he was certainly a tyrant. Eighteenth-century
readers would have found allusions to him in contemporary as well as classical
texts: in Montesquieu, for example, and in Voltaire’s Essai sur les moeurs, Mably’s
Entretiens de Phocion, Marat’s Chains of slavery, and Barthélemy’s Voyage du jeune
Anarchasis en Grèce. On the eve of the Revolution, Sylvain Maréchal’s Histoire
de la Grèce, représentée par ﬁgures (–) featured an engraving of the ‘ruse’
whereby Pisistratus established his tyranny (Figure ).
From , Pisistratus’s name would occasionally crop up in debates in the
Constituent Assembly and Legislative Assembly. Revealingly, speakers did not
need to explain to their listeners who Pisistratus was. His name was not as
widely cited in Revolutionary discourse as Cicero or Brutus, for example, and
when politicians evoked tyrants, they might instead cite Cromwell, Caesar,
Catiline, or various French monarchs. Yet Pisistratus shared the same semantic
Démocratie antique et démocratie moderne (Paris, ), pp. –; Elizabeth Rawson, The Spartan
tradition in European thought (Oxford, ), pp. –; Eric Nelson, The Greek tradition in
republican thought (Cambridge, ).
 See Jean-Louis Quantin, ‘Traduire Plutarque d’Amyot à Ricard: contribution à l’étude de
mythe de Sparte au XVIIIème siècle’, Histoire, économie et société,  (), pp. –.
 Herodotus ( vols., London and New York, NY, –), trans. A. D. Godley, I, pp. –;
Plutarch’s lives ( vols., London and New York, NY, –), trans. Bernadotte Perrin, I,
pp. –.
 These and other usages can be tracked through the datasets Gallica, Frantext/ARTFL, and
ECCO.
 [Sylvain Maréchal], Histoire de la Grèce, représentée par ﬁgures (n.p. [Paris], n.d. [–]),
pp. –, for accompanying text. A copy is held at the Bibliothèque nationale de France
(BnF), J-.
 These may be conveniently viewed through Stanford University’s French Revolution
Digital Archive (https://frda.stanford.edu/).
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ﬁeld. Allusions to him were within the intellectual compass of any literate
French politician worried about the Revolution ending in tyranny.
According to our British spy, Pisistratus came to Parisian minds in May 
amid assassination attempts targeting Robespierre and Collot d’Herbois. Collot
Fig. . Jean-Marie Mixelle, Pisistrate / Par ruse enleve la souveraineté à Solon, in [Sylvain Maréchal],
Histoire de la Grèce, représentée par des ﬁgures (n.p. [Paris], n.d. [–]). Engraving, · × · cm.
Bibliothèque nationale de France, J-.
 Bouineau, Les toges du pouvoir, p. .
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and Robespierre presented their ‘wounds’ in both the Convention and Jacobin
Club, triggering an emotional response. The whole affair, our spy opined, ‘will
serve no little the plans of the Leaders’, who ‘are considering turning it to good
account’, to buttress their own authority; furthermore, ‘this attack will serve as a
pretext for new cruelties’.
There were worse predictions in the course of the Revolution. Many historians
have argued that the Admiral and Renault assassination attempts catalysed state
repression, and exacerbated tensions within the Revolutionary Government.
The introduction of the notorious law of  Prairial ( June) turbocharged
Revolutionary Tribunal convictions. Even more clearly linked to the political
atmosphere following the Admiral/Renault incidents was the infamous law of
 Prairial ( May) which stated that ‘English’ and Hanoverian soldiers would
not be taken prisoner, but would be executed on the spot. Barère, the CPS
member who introduced the decree, blamed the assassination attempts on
British plotting. That line had been elaborated the previous evening in wildly
applauded speeches in the Jacobin Club by Robespierre and Collot. The
enemy powers had tried, Robespierre noted, ‘calumnies, treasons, arsons, poi-
sonings, atheism, bribery, famine’; now they were resorting to ‘assassination, fol-
lowed by assassination, and then more assassination’.
The severity of the  Prairial law so enthusiastically proposed by Barère and
Robespierre was draconian even by the standards of the Terror. It fell way
outside the customary conventions of eighteenth-century warfare. It also up-
ended earlier Revolutionary ideals about conﬂict, notably May  legislation
that, in the spirit of the Rights of Man, had safeguarded the rights of prisoners of
war, insisting that they should be treated as if they were French nationals. The
law also diverged from recent practice at the front, which had urged
 Archives parlementaires de  à , st ser., ed. J. Madival et al. ( vols. to date, Paris,
–) (AP), XC, pp. –, XCI, pp. –, –. The ‘wounds’ were entirely metaphorical.
 TNA, FO /, report titled ‘De la frontière’.
 The judicial reform of  Prairial had, however, been previously planned by Robespierre:
Hervé Leuwers, Robespierre (Paris, ), pp. –.
 AP, XCI, p. . See Sophie Wahnich and Marc Belissa, ‘Les crimes des Anglais: trahir le
droit’, Annales historiques de la Révolution française,  (), pp. –; Erich Pelzer, ‘“Il ne
sera fait aucun prisonnier anglais or hanovrien”: Zur Problematik des Kriegsgefangenen
während der Revolutions- und Empirekriege (–)’, in Rüdiger Overmans, ed., In
der Hand des Feindes: Kriegsgefangenschaft von der Antike bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg (Cologne,
), pp. –. For Franco–British relations generally, see Norman Hampson, The
perﬁdy of Albion: French perceptions of England during the French Revolution (Basingstoke, );
and Sophie Wahnich, L’Impossible citoyen: l’étranger dans le discours de la Révolution française
(Paris, ).
 Maximilien Robespierre, Oeuvres ( vols., Paris and Gap, –), x, p. . Barère’s
initial speech to the Convention on the Admiral affair also blamed England: AP, XC, pp. –,
.
 Stephen Conway, Britain, Ireland, and continental Europe in the eighteenth century (Oxford,
), pp. –.
 AP, XLII, pp. –, see also LXV, pp. –, XLVII, pp. –.
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blandishments to fellow-patriots labouring under tyrannical governments
rather than blood-curdling threats. Yet internationalist appeals to potential
brother sans-culottes were in steep decline. France had claimed to have gone
to war in February  against George III, but as the war progressed the dis-
tinction between the king and his subjects became increasingly blurred in
Revolutionary pronouncements. This was especially as, from late ,
Robespierre became convinced that a ‘foreign plot’ threatened the
Revolution. Tougher measures than ever before were introduced against
enemy non-combatants living in France, culminating in an October 
decree ordering the arrest of all the British, Irish, and Hanoverians present
in France. Suspicion developed that British and Irish so-called friends of the
Revolution in France were acting as spies and subversives, and a number were
guillotined as counter-revolutionaries.
The notion that a ‘foreign plot’ was promoting domestic strife in France also
threatened to collapse distinctions between the internal enemies in France’s
civil war – notably, the merciless violence being deployed against the royalist
uprising in the Vendée – and the external ones of its international conﬂicts.
Already in September , following an allegation that British forces had
killed French prisoners and civilians, the Convention diluted protections to pris-
oners of war, approving military reprisals corresponding to the barbarity of
France’s enemies and ‘renouncing henceforth every philanthropic notion’.
Barère, defending this measure, envisaged such violence expansively: though
France did not wish to make war ‘as cannibals’, ‘when, for the security of the
whole Nation, you are forced, in the Vendée, to burn your own towns, and to
annihilate a royalist and fanaticized population, how can you not employ the
same means against your foreign enemies?’
Additional polemic against the British was cultivated in debates Robespierre
stage-managed at the Jacobin Club in January  on ‘the crimes of the
English government, and the vices of the British constitution’. Robespierre
roundly declared that ‘I do not like the English’, describing them as ‘an insolent
 See, for example, the October  French propaganda pamphlet, To the English sailors,
and soldiers, at Toulon (Paris, ); a copy is held at the BnF, -LB-. See too, in similar
vein, a propagandist French ‘Hymne sur l’air des Marseillois’ written following Toulon’s recap-
ture, exhorting the ‘Sans-Culottes Englais’ to join the French in triumphing against tyrants:
Archives Nationales, Paris (AN), F .
 See Munro Price, ‘The “foreign plot” and the French Revolution: a reappraisal’, in Barry
Coward and Julian Swann, eds., Conspiracies and conspiracy theory in early modern Europe: from the
Waldensians to the French Revolution (Aldershot, ), pp. –.
 See Simon Macdonald, Enemies of the republic: policing the British in Revolutionary Paris,
forthcoming.
 AP, LXXIV, pp. –, , see also LXVII, pp. –.
 AP, LXXIV, p. .
 Our translations of ‘Angleterre’ and ‘Anglais’ reﬂect French practice in ranging from the
limited (‘England’, ‘English’) to the expansive (i.e. a shorthand for ‘Britain’ or ‘British’, and
potentially also encompassing Ireland and the Irish). See also the text of the  Prairial decree
itself: ‘Il ne sera fait aucun prisonnier anglais ou hanovrien.’
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people’ impudently making war on the French (‘the generous people who have
reconquered their liberty’). With the Prairial assassination attempts, this view
further smoothed the way for the Barère decree’s bald brutality. The seeming
conﬁrmation that Britain was engaged in assassinating enemy politicians demon-
strated that it was beyond civilized interchange. Generosity towards the English
people, Barère afﬁrmed, was tantamount to lèse-humanité, that is, treasonous
acts against the human race: ‘humanity’, Barère insisted, ‘consists in exterminat-
ing its enemies: generosity consists in sparing the blood of republicans’. That
there was no dissent in theConventionwhen thePrairial lawwas passed demon-
strated that this view enjoyed political credibility.TheConvention played to the
prevalent mood, ordering that the Barère decree be dispatched to the front
accompanied by a separate, even more sanguinary proclamation: ‘When
victory presents you with English or Hanoverians, strike; none ought to return
to the liberticide lands of Great Britain or to the free soil of France. Let the
English slaves perish and Europe will be free.’
When Barère reported to the Convention on  June  regarding a series
of French victories culminating in the battle of Fleurus, he was cheered raptur-
ously when he pointedly boasted that ‘The English above all are not spared’,
and his description of the battle highlighted the point when French forces
charged on ‘the redcoats’ with bayonets, ‘instead of taking them prisoner.
Not a single one escaped the blows of the republicans.’ On  July, a
similar note was struck in a report to the French admiralty by the captain of
the frigate La Boudeuse, concerning his treatment of a captured British mer-
chant ship: ‘I had the crew brought aboard’, he stated; and then he had
them shot, ‘according to the decree’. Thanks to the  Prairial law, a new,
savage kind of war seemed to be emerging.
In the event, however, the unsparingly anti-British turn in the war’s conduct
proved chimerical, and the La Boudeuse affair is the only known example where
the  Prairial law was unequivocally implemented. There were no land-based
 Robespierre, Oeuvres, x, pp. , –. See F.-A. Aulard, ed., La Société des Jacobins: recueil
de documents pour l’histoire du club des Jacobins de Paris ( vols., Paris, –), V, pp. , –,
–, –, –, , –.
 AP, XCI, p. .
 The Convention received numerous petitions endorsing the measure: AP, XCI, pp. ,
, , , , , , , XCII, pp. , , , , , XCIII, pp. , , –,
, , , XCIV, pp. , –, , .
 AP, XCI, p. ; Journal militaire,  Prairial An  [ June ]. For a reading of the 
Prairial decree as part of a Revolutionary vision of hostis humani generis (‘enemy of the
human race’), see Dan Edelstein, The Terror of natural right: republicanism, the cult of nature,
and the French Revolution (Chicago, IL, ), pp. –, –. See also Anne Simonin, La
déshonneur dans la République: une histoire de l’indignité, – (Paris, ), pp. –.
 AP, XCII, pp. –.
 Service historique de la Défense, Marine BB//, fo. . Cited in Norman Hampson,
‘The idea of the nation in Revolutionary France’, in Alan Forrest and Peter Jones, eds.,
Reshaping France: town, country and region during the French Revolution (Manchester, ),
p.  n. ; see also Hampson, Perﬁdy of Albion, p. .
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incidents – Barère’s notorious hyperbole in speeches reporting military affairs
makes the Fleurus example suspect. Furthermore, the law seems to have elicited
opposition even within the CPS. In particular, Lazare Carnot, the CPS member
most responsible for the war effort, prioritized showing no mercy towards
French émigré troops over exterminating the British.
Historians have long maintained that there was little appetite for implement-
ing the  Prairial law at the front either, ascribing this to an ingrained sense of
humanity among French troops. Our research revisits this question, however,
and suggests that the British played a role in deterring the French from putting
the law into practice, by dint of an ofﬁcial Declaration from the commander in
chief of British forces in Flanders, Frederick Augustus, duke of York, second and
favourite son of George III. News of the  Prairial law had not taken long to
reach the British army at the front. Colonel Harry Calvert, an ofﬁcer on
York’s staff involved in intelligence matters, will have seen spy reports in late
May that ascribed the unwillingness of French soldiers to desert to their convic-
tion that ‘those who are made prisoners [by the British] are murdered’.
Calvert had noted on  June that hand-bills containing the Convention’s
decree had been distributed throughout the French army, and he now
grasped how the British might turn the  Prairial law to advantage:
I think that by moderation much good may accrue to us from this manoeuvre of the
Convention. By disclaiming any idea of following an example so atrocious, we may
awaken the sparks of honour yet remaining in the French army, and point out to
what an extent it is made the tool of its sanguinary employers.
Accordingly, the next day, York issued a Declaration in riposte to the
Convention’s decree. This overtly propagandistic document restated the
British commitment to the traditional policy of taking prisoners rather than
massacring them. Drafted by the army’s adjutant-general, Colonel James
Craig, seemingly under close direction from York himself, it was to be read
and explained to the British forces at their roll-call in an explicit response to
Barère’s decree. Frequently evoked in historians’ accounts, the York
Declaration has never to our knowledge been located or analysed. We have
 F.-A. Aulard, ed., Recueil des actes du Comité de salut public avec la correspondance ofﬁcielle des
représentants en mission et le registre du conseil exécutif provisoire ( vols., Paris, –), XIV,
p. .
 David A. Bell, The ﬁrst total war: Napoleon’s Europe and the birth of warfare as we know it
(Boston, MA, ), p. .
 TNA, WO /, fo. ,  May .
 Harry Vernet, ed., Journals and correspondence of General Sir Harry Calvert (London, ),
p. . News of the  Prairial decree reached Brussels by  June: see British Library Add. MS
. See also [J. F. Neville], Leisure moments in the camp and in the guard-room (York, ),
pp. –.
 Craig to Evan Nepean,  June , TNA, WO /, fos. –.
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identiﬁed the manuscript ‘authentic copy’ sent by Craig to London to serve as
an ofﬁcial record, and we base our analysis on this document.
The Convention, the York Declaration stated, ‘pursuing that gradation of
Crimes and Horrors which has distinguished the period of its Government as
the most calamitous of any that has yet occurred in the History of the World,
has just passed a Decree, that their Soldiers shall give no Quarter to the
British and Hannoverian Troops’. While York anticipated the ‘indignation &
horror’ which this would naturally elicit among the ‘Brave Troops’ of his
army, he instructed that they should nonetheless continue to take prisoners.
Declaring that ‘mercy to the vanquished is the Brightest Gem in a Soldier’s
character’, moreover, he exhorted his men ‘not to Suffer their resentment to
lead to any precipitate act of cruelty on their part which may sully the reputation
they have acquired in the World’. ‘Humanity and kindness’ had always charac-
terized relations between soldiers of the two nations once conﬂict ended, and
even during wartime had been extended to their wounded.
York thus sought to drive a wedge between France’s political leaders in Paris
and its army: ‘it will be difﬁcult for brave Men to conceive, that any set of Men
who are themselves exempt from sharing in the dangers of War, should be so
base and Cowardly as to seek to aggravate the calamities of it upon the unfortu-
nate people who are subject to their orders’. He invoked an unwritten sense of
military honour as the basis for believing that French soldiers could not possibly
so far ‘forget their characters as Soldiers, as to pay any attention to a Decree as
injurious to themselves, as it is disgraceful to the persons who passed it’. York
expressed conﬁdence that soldierly solidarity would trump French obedience
to the Convention’s orders: ‘the Soldiers of both Nations will conﬁne their sen-
timents of resentment and abhorence to the National Convention alone’. No
‘Frenchman, who possesses one spark of Honor or one principle of a soldier’
could, he trusted, do otherwise.
Despite this upbeat note, York ended with an explicit threat about what would
result if Barère’s decree were observed by the French army. With words that
echoed the infamous Brunswick Declaration in August , he promised
punitive retaliation and escalation:
the French army alone will be answerable for the Tenfold Vengeance which will fall
upon themselves their Wives and their Children, and their unfortunate Country,
already groaning under every calamity which the accumulated crimes of unprin-
cipled ambition and avarice can heap upon their devoted Victims[.]
The York Declaration was thus an artful combination of carrot and stick. It
offered humane treatment to those French soldiers who showed humanity to
 See Appendix. Historical accounts of the Declaration are invariably based on untrust-
worthy contemporaneous versions. In a recent example, Jean-Clément Martin (Robespierre: la
fabrication d’un monstre (Paris, ), p. ) appears to quote from the Declaration but is in
fact citing Robespierre’s distorted rendition of it.
 AP, XLVII, pp. –.
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their British opponents in the customary manner. Yet it threatened ﬁre and
brimstone for combatants and non-combatants alike if French troops obeyed
the  Prairial law. French troops may well have appreciated the Declaration’s
chivalrous generosity of spirit – but would also have been understandably appre-
hensive about their own well-being and that of their comrades and in many
cases their families too if they chose to obey the Convention’s orders. The prin-
ciple of symmetry in handling prisoners of war was long established in inter-
national law: extending mercy to prisoners legitimated the expectation of
reciprocal treatment – and, conversely, excessive violence towards them
justiﬁed receiving the same in return. Fear of reprisals ranked alongside
humanity and chivalry as considerations.
The military frontline was more permeable than the manichean rhetoric of
the political principals in Paris imagined. Between the two armies, there
existed a kind of contact zone wherein illicit communication occurred and
rumour throve. The British appear to have been rather imaginative in their
stratagems for getting propaganda tracts across the lines, at one point even
countenancing using aerial bombardment from balloons. On the occasion
of the Declaration, Craig explicitly stated that copies of the document were to
be printed for frontline dissemination, so as ‘to fall into the hands’ of the
French troops and thereby to increase ‘the discontent of their Army’ –
although we do not know the ruses employed. A French source later recorded
that he had personally seen a copy of the Declaration at the army’s headquar-
ters in Guise. British evidence conﬁrms the Declaration’s diffusion on the
French side. On  June, Craig passed on reports of the law’s unpopularity, espe-
cially among the French cavalry; on  June, he noted that ‘Some Prisoners
taken this day say that the order for not giving Quarter to the British &
Hanoverians has been publickly rescinded’ in the French army, ‘and in very
strong terms’. The evidence we have thus points to the law being widely
 Renaud Morieux, ‘Patriotisme humanitaire et prisonniers de guerre en France et en
Grande-Bretagne pendant la Révolution française et l’Empire’, in Laurent Bourquin,
Philippe Hamon, Alain Hugon, and Yann Lagadec, eds., La politique par les armes: conﬂits inter-
nationaux et politisation, XVe–XIXe siècle (Rennes, ), pp. –.
 Our thinking on this point has been inﬂuenced by scholarship on the English Channel:
Renaud Morieux, The Channel: England, France and the construction of a maritime border in the eight-
eenth century (Cambridge, ); Margaret Cohen and Carolyn Dever, eds., The literary Channel:
the inter-national invention of the novel (Princeton, NJ, ).
 On the British army’s propaganda efforts, see Alfred H. Burne, The noble duke of York: the
military life of Frederick duke of York and Albany (London and New York, NY, ), pp. –; John
A. Lynn, The bayonets of the republic: motivation and tactics in the army of Revolutionary France, –
 (Urbana, IL, and Chicago, IL, ), p. . For the balloons, see Samuel Swinton to
Henry Dundas,  June , TNA, HO /, fo. .
 Craig to Nepean,  June , TNA, WO /, fo. .
 R. J. Durdent, Histoire de la Convention nationale de France, accompagnée d’un coup-d’oeil sur les
assemblées constituante et legislative ( vols., Paris, ), II, p. .
 Craig to Nepean,  June , TNA, WO /, fos. –; ibid., fo. ,  June. See
also Vernet, ed., Journals and correspondence of General Sir Harry Calvert, p. .
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disregarded by French soldiers. One British ofﬁcer’s memoirs later stated that
York’s Declaration ‘carried to the French posts’, ‘produced considerable effect,
and the French ofﬁcers took every opportunity of declaring that they disre-
garded Robespierre’s sanguinary edict’. The anonymous account of
another British soldier states that the  Prairial law ‘never met with any appro-
bation from the French army, who, on most occasions, behaved with the great-
est kindness and liberality to the British troops, whom the chance of war threw
into their hands’. He concluded that this ‘may partly be attributed’ to the
‘admirable Manifesto published on the occasion’ by York.
Besides impacting upon the French army, the York Declaration was aimed at
inﬂuencing international public opinion. The manuscript ‘authentic copy’ of
the Declaration sent to London was intended for press dissemination. Craig sug-
gested publication in The Sun, a newspaper friendly to the government, and the
Morning Chronicle, an opposition newspaper of which copies were known to
reach France. In the event, the text was initially carried on  June in The
Times, another paper close to government, and the Morning Chronicle.
Numerous other British publications subsequently reported it. The law’s
wide media resonance conﬁrmed the British reading public in the barbarity
of the French Revolutionary state, a cherished theme in counter-revolutionary
propaganda.
Craig also intended the York Declaration to insinuate itself within French
public opinion. Here too his efforts met with success. The Declaration soon
appeared in French translation in newspapers on the continent. The Brussels-
based Journal général de la guerre printed it on  June, for example, followed
by the Courrier belgique ( June), and the Gazette de Leyde ( June). The
British-based but francophone Courier de Londres and Correspondance politique
carried it on  and  June respectively. But arguably the Declaration regis-
tered its greatest propaganda success by being picked up and attacked by no
less a ﬁgure than Robespierre.
The Declaration had been packaged with some deliberately anti-Robespierre
jibes. It scorned the idea – ‘too absurd to be Noticed, and still more to be
 Ernest Taylor, ed., The Taylor papers: being a record of certain reminiscences, letters, and journals
in the life of Lieut.-Gen. Sir Herbert Taylor (London, ), pp. –.
 Journal kept in the British army, from the landing of the troops under the command of Earl Moira, at
Ostend, in June , to their return to England the following year (Liverpool, ), pp. –.
 Craig to Nepean,  June , TNA, WO /, fo. . On the Morning Chronicle in
France, see Simon Macdonald, ‘English-language newspapers in Revolutionary France’,
Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies,  (), p. .
 A brief report also appeared in the London Packet, – June .
 St James’s Chronicle, – June ; Whitehall Evening Post, – June ; London
Chronicle, – June ; The Oracle,  and  June ; The Sun,  and  June ;
The Times,  June .
 See David Bindman, The shadow of the guillotine: Britain and the French Revolution (London,
). See also Gilbert Wakeﬁeld, Remarks on the general orders of the duke of York to his army, on
June ,  (London, ).
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refuted’ – that the British were engaged upon the selective assassination of
Revolutionary leaders, as both Barère and Robespierre had claimed in Paris.
Such a view, the Declaration contended, was just a manoeuvre to increase
domestic repression. If there were a tyrant involved, it was not King George
III, but Robespierre, who was tilting for the status of monarch. ‘The French
must themselves see through the ﬂimsy artiﬁce of a pretended assassination
by which Robespierre has succeeded in procuring that Military Guard which
has at once established him the successor of the unfortunate Louis, by whatever
Name he may choose to dignify his future Reign.’ By such Machiavellian man-
oeuvrings, including equipping himself with a personal bodyguard, Robespierre
was preparing to join the ranks of political tyrants.
Robespierre, ever watchful regarding his personal reputation, rose to the bait.
On  June, he introduced the topic at the Jacobin Club. His phrasing implied
that the Declaration was not yet known to his audience: ‘I come to make known
to you and to lay before your eyes a sort of proclamation published in the British
forces, by order of the so-called duke of York.’ Robespierre then turned mouth-
piece for the Declaration, reading out passages and commenting on them.
Journalists following the debate, but presumably lacking the text of the
Declaration themselves, carried Robespierre’s speech only in précis form.
The Moniteur reported:
Robespierre read out this proclamation, coated in all the distinctive character and
perﬁdious cunning and low villainy of tyrants. Although most contemptible in
itself, he continued, it is not inopportune to add a short commentary.
He immediately took it up again line by line, and gave an energetic discussion to
each point of view it presents whilst covering each with all the indignation of
angered integrity, or with all the ridicule that ill-disguised baseness brings upon
itself. Every word of the orator was worth a sentence, every sentence a speech,
given how much sense and energy he packed into everything he says.
The core of Robespierre’s refutation of York’s argument was that the inher-
ited principle of clemency (‘clémence’) towards enemy troops was obsolete. In
March and April , Robespierre had been the most vehement opponent of
the indulgence and clémence towards the Terror shown by Georges Danton,
Camille Desmoulins, and their other alleged co-conspirators in notorious
 Robespierre, Oeuvres, x, p. . A manuscript translation of York’s Declaration survives in
the French diplomatic archives: Archives des Affaires Étrangères, Paris, Correspondance poli-
tique Angleterre , fos. –. The source text upon which this translation is based is given as
issue number  of the Courier and Evening Gazette. This issue of the Courier, of which we have
been unable to trace an extant copy, was published on  June . Its publication of the York
Declaration on that date would therefore have been part of the initial group of London news-
papers to print the text. Whether a copy of (or excerpt from) the Courier published in London
on  June could have reached Robespierre in Paris by  June is unclear; it may be that
Robespierre received York’s text from another source.
 Robespierre, Oeuvres, x, p. .
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factional trials. As within France then, so without France now. Soldiers in
opposing armies may have been merciful to each other in the past. But this
had now become impossible, Robespierre held. In present circumstances,
there could be no common ground between ‘the soldiers of liberty and the
slaves of tyranny’. Ruled by a tyrannical king, England had become a tyrant
among nations.
Robespierre argued that York was guilty of rank hypocrisy, moreover, in
giving his Declaration a humanitarian sheen. ‘Yorck talks of humanity! What!
Yorck, a tyrant, a soldier of George, the orator of a government which has
ﬁlled the universe with its crimes and its infamies…How odious is a tyrant there-
fore while he talks of humanity!’
Robespierre was correct in perceiving the Declaration as aimed at inciting dis-
obedience among French soldiers and dividing the army from government. His
antagonism towards York’s ‘plan of division’ may have been exacerbated by
awareness that the law was not being strictly enforced at the front, and he
may have thought it prudent to issue a pre-emptive riposte to the Declaration
before it gained traction in France. Yet by attacking the Declaration before
anyone much in Paris had even heard of it, Robespierre was also becoming
its ampliﬁer in the public sphere. This was all the more signiﬁcant, moreover,
in that the Declaration had personalized its attacks on Robespierre himself.
The manner in which the document spotlighted his own personal conduct
and putative ambitions, and blamed him for all Revolutionary ills, caused him
intense and unfeigned irritation. ‘And what is the meaning of this preference
that the duke of York gives to me?’, he expostulated. ‘I thought I was a French
citizen’, and yet ‘he makes me king of France and Navarre.’ (The latter
words are in fact not found in the Declaration.) He did not wish to descend,
he stated, from the heady heights of French citizenship to be abased by being
placed on the throne by ‘tyrants and their henchmen’.
The sarcasm was a little too heavy in this passage, however, the tone a little too
imperious, the rewording of York’s phrases a little too random, for the speech
not to suggest that Robespierre was personally nettled. His annoyance extended
to the question of a supposed military guard that accompanied him. This was
just mendacious: ‘The duke of York adds that I am surrounded by a military
guard. As you can see’, he noted with dripping sarcasm, ‘it is a most constant
fact.’
The bodyguard issue was particularly moot, since at the May session of the
Jacobin Club in which Robespierre and Collot were acclaimed for surviving
 For Robespierre ﬂirting with the notion of ‘clémence’, see his speech in the Convention,
 Frimaire An  [ Dec. ]: Oeuvres, x, pp. –. But by Feb. , he had swung back
towards a more brutally manichean posture: ‘To punish the oppressors of humanity: that is
clemency; to forgive them, that is barbarity.’ Oeuvres, x, p. .
 Ibid., p. .
 Ibid., p. .
 Ibid., p. .
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assassination attempts, Robespierre had speciﬁcally rejected proposals that he
and the Convention should be given an armed guard. The suggestion seems
to have emerged from the Paris sections: in petitions sent to the Convention
responding to news of the attempted assassinations, the Cité and Chalier sec-
tions urged ‘an elite guard’ or ‘a sacred battalion’ to protect the whole assem-
bly, while the Montblanc section proposed that the committees of government
be placed in the Louvre under ‘a shield’ of sans-culottes. But when the matter
was raised at the Jacobin Club, the fact that these motions were supported by
fellow-Jacobins such as the maverick Alexandre Rousselin, whose political
motives Robespierre suspected, made him rule such ideas completely out of
court. His ally, René-François Dumas, president of the Revolutionary
Tribunal, produced an appropriate echo, stating that the Convention would
never abide such a guard, even ‘were it to have the name of guard of
friendship’.
This war of words, venomously and vicariously conducted between
Robespierre and York, played into established political tropes. When introdu-
cing the  Prairial law at the Convention, Barère had noted how British propa-
ganda depicted Robespierre as effective dictator and putative king of the
French, making him personally responsible for the CPS’s policies and the
war’s conduct. Robespierre himself, in concluding discussion at the same
sitting, observed that ‘calumnies’ were among the disreputable techniques of
war directed against the republic and its leaders. Conversely, in personalizing
his attack on York, Robespierre was targeting a key bugaboo of Revolutionary
propaganda.
Along with British Prime Minister William Pitt and commander of allied
forces, the duke of Saxe-Coburg, York was a storied ﬁgure in French polemics
revolving around counter-revolutionary plots and foreign subversion – and a
caricaturist’s dream: a  print, for example, commissioned as CPS propa-
ganda, shows him being unceremoniously spanked by the French General
Pichegru, with the duke, bedecked with ass’s ears, revealing the coat of arms
of England tattooed onto his rear. His notoriety in France went back to
January  when the radical journalist Jean-Louis Carra had proposed
 AP, XC, pp. , –. See also Pierre Caron, ed., Paris pendant la Terreur: rapports des
agents secrets du Ministre de l’intérieur ( vols., Paris [then Geneva], –), III, p. .
 Aulard’s account seems to identify Rousselin and Legendre as Robespierre’s antagonists
on this issue: Aulard, ed., Société des Jacobins, VI, pp. –; Robespierre, Oeuvres, x, pp. –.
See also Arne Ording, Le bureau de police du Comité de salut public: étude sur la Terreur (Oslo, ),
pp. –. Legendre’s name had arisen in investigations undertaken on  Prairial in the
Admiral case: Alexandre Tuetey, Répertoire général des sources manuscrites de l’histoire de Paris
pendant la Révolution française ( vols., Paris, –), XI, p. . For Rousselin, see Jeff
Horn, Eyewitness to revolutions: Alexandre Rousselin, –, book manuscript in preparation.
 Aulard, ed., Société des Jacobins, VI, p. .
 AP, XCI, pp. –, .
 [Dubois], ‘La Correction Républicaine’ (n.d. []). See Patrick Laharie, ‘Les burins de
la Terreur’, Histoire et archives,  (), pp. , –.
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York’s candidacy to the French throne as a possible substitute for Louis XVI, in
the event that the latter again attempted ﬂight, on the grounds that this dyn-
astic link could pre-empt armed conﬂict against Britain. The idea provoked
consternation at the time, and re-emerged with a vengeance as a charge
against Carra (by then a member of the Convention) in the febrile atmos-
phere of August . With a republic declared, France and Britain at war,
and York directing a British army on French soil, Robespierre lambasted
Carra for having ‘constantly pursued the project of placing a prince of
England on the French throne’. In further polemics, York became viewed
as the British government’s preferred candidate for the French throne and
as central to a web of counter-revolutionary intrigue – including assassination
plots. Another item was added to the charge-sheet against York in early 
with the uncovering of an unsavoury ﬁnancial episode from , whereby he
and his two royal brothers, the prince of Wales and the duke of Clarence, had
borrowed heavily on the Paris ﬁnance market. The loan venture was repre-
sented in the Convention as a ‘conspiracy formed by the court of London’,
with it being taken as axiomatic that ‘a borrowing by the three sons of
George’ was ‘doubtless directed by Pitt’. In an imaginative manoeuvre, the
perﬁdious British were subverting the republic with money which had been
borrowed in France.
Given this pedigree, ridiculing York’s claims to humanity was an easy task,
even for an orator as humourless as Robespierre. York was called many things
in the s – it was he after all who would be ridiculed forever in English
folk song as the ‘Grand Old Duke’ who marched his men ‘up to the top of
the hill’ and then ‘down again’ – but humane is not one of them, even if some-
times the word did pass his lips. His calls for surrender in the sieges of
Valenciennes and Dunkirk during the summer of , for example, had
been laced with talk of ‘humanity and generosity’ – even as he threatened the
cities with ‘irremediable ruin’ if they continued to resist. Moreover, York
had a poor reputation for humane conduct even toward his own troops. The
artist Joseph Farington, who visited the British forces in Flanders in ,
wrote that York ‘was said to have unnecessarily or injudiciously exposed his
troops to slaughter and that He had used improper expressions showing
much levity as that: “He had bled His troops to prove their quality”, and such
 Aulard, ed., Société des Jacobins, III, pp. –.
 Robespierre, Oeuvres, x, p. .
 The Convention was told documents had been discovered revealing British subversion in
France. These featured references to ‘the duke’, with York the obvious referent: see AP, LXX,
pp. –. On York as a supposed candidate for the French throne, see Étienne Charavay,
ed., Correspondance générale de Carnot ( vols., Paris, –), III, p. ; Robespierre,
Oeuvres, x, pp. , , , .
 AP, LXXXV, p. , XCI, p. .
 Burne, Noble duke of York, pp. –.
 AP, LXX, p. , LXXIII, p. .
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like ill considered words’. One British radical broadside, satirizing the 
campaign, dubbed York a ‘Kill-’Em-All’ whose bloodthirstiness had backﬁred
on his own troops while the opposing French army had triumphed. At the
time of his verbal sparring with Robespierre, moreover, the fortunes of the
allied armies were at a low ebb following York’s recent defeat at Tourcoing: ‘dis-
asters have followed disasters’, was one military estimate. In some ways, there-
fore, one might see the  Prairial decree as a propaganda gift to a beleaguered
and unpopular commander. It gave York opportunity to claim moral high
ground even as the British were coming off worse in the military struggle.
If, as we shall see, the war of words continued, the dramatic effort to trans-
form the conduct of war had ﬁzzled out. This received conﬁrmation from an
unlikely source – from Robespierre himself, in his last great speech before the
Convention, on the eve of  Thermidor. Denouncing the leadership of the
French war effort (in the scarcely veiled form of his CPS colleague Carnot),
and repeatedly going out of his way to insult York, he noted angrily that ‘your
decree against the English has been eternally violated; England, so manhandled
by our speeches, is spared by our arms’. The Terror was not being carried out
as it should be in Robespierre’s opinion against France’s external enemies.
Robespierre’s earlier attack on York on  June had, moreover, been given an
additional twist three days later, when he launched a tirade at the Jacobin Club
about how his speech had beenmisreported in the press. In particular, he bitterly
attacked the editors of the Moniteur for composing ‘sycophancies and inaccur-
acies’. Press coverage of his anti-York speech, he stated, was a complete misrep-
resentation. He reproved the newspaper in particular for the over-the-top ﬂattery
of a comment regarding the speech: ‘every word was worth a sentence, every sen-
tence a speech’. According to Robespierre, treating him as special in this way
played up to York’s claims. He further reproached the reporter for failing to
detect the irony with which he had treated York’s allegation that he had a military
guard. Many readers, he complained, would have missed the throwaway irony of
the statement, ‘The duke of York adds that I am surrounded by amilitary guard. As
you can see, it is a most constant fact’, and would have assumed that Robespierre
was speaking the unvarnished truth.
 Joseph Farington, ‘Fair copy of the tour to Valenciennes’ (original manuscript in the
Royal Library, Windsor; edited typescript copy at the Department of Prints and Drawings,
British Museum, London), journal entry for  Aug. . Cited in Simon Macdonald, ‘“To
shew virtue its own image”: William Hodges’s The effects of peace and The consequences of war,
–’, British Art Journal,  (), p. .
 Harlequin impeacher (n.p., n.d. [?Apr. ]), repr. in John Barrell, ‘Exhibition extraordin-
ary!!’ Radical broadsides of the mid s (Nottingham, ), p. .
 An accurate and impartial narrative of the war, by an ofﬁcer of the guards ( vols., London, n.d.
[by ]), II, p. .
 Robespierre, Oeuvres, x, p. ; for the references to York, see ibid., pp. , .
 Aulard, ed., Société des Jacobins, VI, pp. –; Robespierre, Oeuvres, x, p. .
 Robespierre, Oeuvres, x, p. .
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The Moniteur would defend itself by pointing out that its account had been
taken word-for-word from the Journal de la Montagne, the Jacobins’ own in-
house newspaper, and that they had left in the piece of ﬂattery at which
Robespierre protested inadvertently. But this was not good enough for
Robespierre, who expressed a fear that France’s advantage on the battleﬁeld
might be sabotaged by false friends and covert enemies within the print
media. The press was intimately bound up in factionalism and treachery:
Whosoever has ideas about the Revolution and its enemies must grasp their tactic.
They have several, but one of the simplest and most powerful is to mislead public
opinion about principles and about men. This is why newspapers always play a
role in revolutions. Their enemies have always had writers in their pay.
This general sentiment was of a piece with the views on censorship that
Robespierre expressed on numerous occasions. In the circumstances, one
can well understand the reaction of many newspaper editors in seeking
Robespierre’s imprimatur before publishing his speeches. But this does not
explain why he should have been so sensitive about the issue of the military
guard. Perhaps, we surmise, there was an unavowed reason behind
Robespierre being rattled. Perhaps at that moment, Robespierre realized, as
our British spy had announced, that the story of Pisistratus – whose exemplary
use of a military guard to seize personal power was well known – was in ‘every-
one’s minds’? And even if the example of Pisistratus was not in ‘everyone’s’
minds, there were grounds for thinking that it was lurking in the minds of
Robespierre and his political enemies. For, as we shall now explore,
Robespierre’s enemies had begun to equate him with Pisistratus.
I I
When the feckless twenty-year-old Cécile Renault was interrogated by the
Committee of General Security about why she had sought access to
Robespierre armed with two knives (admittedly only penknives), she stated
that ‘I only went to Robespierre’s home to see what a tyrant looked like.’
Robespierre could hurl the charge of tyranny against the English nation; but
such an incident underlined that the charge of aspiring to supreme power was
coming from domestic as well as foreign sources. Accusations even surfaced in
the CPS if we can believe later accounts: it seems to have been in Prairial that
Carnot, for example, was said to have rounded on Robespierre and Saint-Just
 Ibid., p. .
 Ibid., pp. –.
 For a report from this time that claimed Robespierre had demanded that no reporting of
his speeches should be made without his prior approval, see Annales de la République française, 
Messidor An  [ July ].
 AP, XCI, p. .
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and dubbed them ‘ridiculous dictators’. Various issues, including the 
Prairial law forced through the Convention by Robespierre and his allies, seem
to have been in contention. It was indeed from June onwards, according to the
liberal historian François-Auguste Mignet, that Robespierre’s CPS colleagues
began to suspect himof planning a tyrannical coupd’état. ‘Amongst themselves’,
he wrote in his  history of the Revolution, ‘they called him Pisistratus’, and
‘this namepassed frommouth tomouth’.Pisistratus, apparently, hadbecome a
coded way of referring to Robespierre.
This association may well have started earlier. For the name of Pisistratus and
its speciﬁc reference to Robespierre had already served as a kind of shuttlecock
in the factional strife of late  and early . Allegations of tyrannical
aspirations had ever been a leitmotiv in Revolutionary discourse, and indeed
before Robespierre gained an ascendant position in the Convention he was con-
stantly charging political opponents with tyrannical tendencies. In October
, he had been involved in opposing the Girondin demand that the
Convention, to secure itself against the Parisian sans-culottes, should have an
armed bodyguard, a covert means of preparing a coup d’état – very much in
the style of Pisistratus. ‘Why an armed force? The only guard for the
Convention is the people’s love’, proclaimed the Montagnard Bentabole,
while Tallien attacked the idea as equivalent to reviving Louis XVI’s personal
bodyguard (‘une garde de parade’) or Rome’s imperial force (the ‘garde
prétorienne’). In December , during a stormy Convention debate over
the fate of the duke of Orleans, Robespierre became involved in an altercation
with his Girondin opponents, whom he accused of plotting to seize power. This
triggered tumultuous scenes where Robespierre was shouted down. In one
account, an unnamed deputy was recorded as yelling out that Robespierre
was ‘the ape of Pisistratus’ (le singe de Pisistrate). In an article published in
January , Robespierre sought to bat back the Pisistratus comparison to
his Girondin opponents. Dipping into the politics of ancient Athens – Rome
and ancient Sparta were his more normal frames of reference – he highlighted
the risk of seeing ‘the tyranny of Pisistratus arise’ on the ruins of ‘short-lived and
insecure legislation’. This would have been the fate of France, he argued, had it
not been for the sovereign people’s intervention on  August . As Anne
 Réponse des membres des deux anciens comités de salut public et de sûreté générale, aux imputations
renouvellées contre eux, par Laurent Lecointre de Versailles, et déclarées calomnieuses par décret du  fruc-
tidor dernier; à la Convention nationale (Paris, An  []), p. . See also Ording, Le bureau de
police du Comité de salut public, p. .
 F. A. Mignet, Histoire de la Révolution française, depuis  jusqu’en  (Paris, ),
p. .
 Aulard, ed., Société des Jacobins, IV, pp. –.
 Robespierre, Oeuvres, IX, p. .
 ‘Lettre de Maximilien Robespierre à MM. Vergniaud, Gensonné, Brissot et Guadet, sur la
souveraineté du peuple et sur leur système de l’appel du jugement de Louis Capet’, in Lettre de
Maximilien Robespierre…à ses commettans, no. ; repr. Robespierre, Oeuvres, V, pp. – n. . A
lexicographical study of a selection of Robespierre’s speeches notes sixty-seven references to
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Simonin has shown, a concern with preventing Revolutionary government from
transforming into (or facilitating the advent of) military dictatorship lay at the
heart of Robespierre’s thinking. It was probably good sense, however, given
the ‘ape of Pisistratus’ jibe, for Robespierre himself not to over-use the
example of Pisistratus. Yet Robespierre’s Girondin critics did not slacken in pur-
suing Robespierre for tyrannical intent. Articles in pro-Girondin journals such
as the Bulletin des amis de la vérité and the Chronique du mois poured scorn on
Robespierre who they alleged sought to become a latterday Solon, serving
‘for arbitrator, for judge, and for drafting a constitution’. But had not Solon sub-
sequently become ‘the friend and partisan of Pisistratus’?
The expulsion of the Girondins in the journées of May and  June  did
not, moreover, erase the image of Robespierre as ‘the ape of Pisistratus’,
although once he became a member of the CPS in July  the epithet was
doubtless deployed more cautiously. It returned into vogue by the spring of
, when in a factional struggle Robespierre and his allies worked to send
their political enemies to the guillotine. Among the Indulgents in the Dantonist
faction was Camille Desmoulins, journalist, deputy, and Robespierre’s old
school-friend, who would be executed on  April . In an unpublished frag-
ment, which almost certainly reached the ears of Robespierre and the
Revolutionary Government, Desmoulins praised Athenian democracy and
reserved tough words for Pisistratus.
The conﬁdence of the sans-culottes went so far as to furnish Pisistratus with the power
to subjugate them supremely: just to have conspired against his life became a crime
of treason, and thereafter he was a complete tyrant: so it goes whenever conspiring
against a man becomes equated to conspiring against the republic; whenever the
people is represented by citizens so ill-informed about their task as to tie themselves
to doctrines, or to the reputation of a single individual, no matter how good a sans-
culotte he might seem to them.
ﬁgures from antiquity, of which twenty-six related to Greek history, but does not cite Pisistratus:
Cesare Vetter, Marco Marin, and Elisabetta Gon, Dictionnaire Robespierre: léxicométrie et usages lan-
gagiers: outils pour une histoire du lexique de l’Incorruptible, I (Trieste, ), p. . However, their
corpus excludes the Pisistratus reference discussed here, which comes from Robespierre’s
journalism.
 Simonin, La déshonneur dans la République.
 Bulletin des amis de la vérité,  Apr. ; for another version of this text, see Chronique du
mois, May .
 The Pisistratus reference remained current over the following months, but with shifting
and ambiguous valencies. In an address sent to the Convention in Aug.  by the Section
de l’Égalité de Châteauroux, the ‘intrepid Montagnards’ were asked (in a question which
muddled Roman and Athenian history) to ‘Beware of new Pisistratuses coming to occupy
your curule seats’: AP, LXXIII, p. . For a possible further reference targeting Robespierre
through the Pisistratus comparison, see CPS member Billaud-Varenne’s speech of Nov.
: AP, LXXIX, p. .
 Camille Desmoulins, Le Vieux Cordelier, ed. Henri Calvet (Paris, ), p. .
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The allegory could not be clearer: the Athenian people were equated with the
sans-culottes, while if the man these had brought to power and adulated was not
named, it was clearly Robespierre. Although the latter might appear to have the
values of a good sans-culotte, in reality he aspired to tyranny.
Desmoulins was not alone in citing the Pisistratus comparison, as
Robespierre’s ally Saint-Just was to attest. It had currency at the heart of a
CPS itself increasingly riven by faction. Saint-Just’s undelivered speech in
defence of Robespierre on  Thermidor contained a critique of the recent
behaviour within the CPS of Billaud-Varenne, who had shaped up as one of
Robespierre’s sternest critics. Dramatically breaking the conﬁdentiality of the
CPS’s inner workings, Saint-Just portrayed Billaud as always muttering, ‘We
are walking on a volcano’, and evoking the name of Pisistratus among the
dangers facing the Revolution. Billaud ‘called such a man when absent [under-
stood to be a wry reference to Robespierre] Pisistratus, today when present, he
was his friend’. He alternated between the words ‘Pisistratus’ or ‘dangers’, Saint-
Just claimed. Seemingly, on  Thermidor, when an attempt had been made to
heal the rift between Robespierre and the rump of the CPS, ‘Billaud-Varenne
said to Robespierre: we are your friends; we have always walked together. This two-
facedness’, Saint-Just wrote, ‘made my heart shudder. The day before he had
called him Pisistratus, and had drawn up his bill of indictment.’
In a stepped, ongoing process, Pisistratus had thus become a code-word by
which Robespierre’s enemies evoked his ambitions for supreme power.
Reference to a Greek tyrant will have seemed more appropriate for
Robespierre rather than a military-style dictator on the English (Cromwell) or
else the Roman model that seems to have been foremost in Robespierre’s own
mind. But the Athenian identiﬁcation rested on a number of other points of
comparison. If Pisistratus represented the Hill Dwellers, for example,
Robespierre for his part was of course a member of the Montagne
(‘Mountain’) in the Convention. Furthermore, like Pisistratus, Robespierre’s
support lay among the popular classes; he had been swept into government in
 amid a wave of sans-culotte enthusiasm. And long before his arrival in the
CPS, this champion of the people deployed an egalitarian language to seek
popular endorsement for his policies. His role as ideologist and originator of
the Cult of the Supreme Being inaugurated on  June  constituted
another point of rapprochement, for Pisistratus was known for having created
and sponsored public festivals. Indeed, Mignet reports that Robespierre’s
enemies in government feared that the inauguration of the Cult of the
Supreme Being would be the moment that Robespierre seized power. This did
 Antoine-Louis de Saint-Just, Oeuvres complètes, ed. Anne Kupiec and Miguel Abensour
([Paris], ), pp. –, .
 We owe this point to Ariane Fichtl (private correspondence).
 As is well known, the termMontagne originated from the left-wing deputies occupying the
high seats in the Convention hall, which became known as the ‘Montagne’.
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not transpire, although Robespierre’s leading role that day brought many of his
colleagues into open hostility against what they took to be his apparent narcis-
sism, self-seeking arrogance, and political ambition.
The ruse which Pisistratus used to seize power –mutilating himself and then
using his wounds to attract sympathy and protection among the people – also
had strong Robespierrist resonance. The British spy we cited at the beginning
of this article suggested that Robespierre would use the supposed danger of
assassination in early Prairial to make political capital, cultivate popular
support, and strengthen his position. His speeches in the Convention and the
Jacobin Club at that juncture were indeed constructed around his self-ascribed
status as a potential martyr of revolution, whose life had been spared this time
but who remained available for patriotic victimhood.
Ostentatious invocation of one’s death in the patriotic cause was not conﬁned
to Robespierre of course. It was a staple of Revolutionary, and especially
Montagnard, discourse that played into the sentimental narrative. Yet even
Robespierre’s enemies would grudgingly admit that it was a trait he displayed
more artfully, more frequently, and for longer than anyone else. Even before
Robespierre had entered the national political stage in  he had used a rhet-
oric ofmartyrdom.Hedeveloped this self-sacriﬁcing tropeas a signaturegesture
in the Constituent Assembly where threats of violence on his person by sabre-
rattling royalists were frequent, and when his life was indeed sometimes in
danger. The element of pathos in his speeches was particularly evident when
his back was against the wall. Thus, the taunt of being ‘the ape of Pisistratus’
came when he was being shouted down by his Girondin opponents. As he strove
to overcome the hubbub, he exclaimed, ‘Let me be heard or cut my throat.’
It was by presenting himself in this melodramatic way – as apparently at his
weakest, unwilling to resist his own death in the public cause – that
Robespierre’s rhetoric sometimes produced the strongest effects on his audi-
ence, promoting his prestige and power. Yet this was not always the case, as was
to be shown in his famous ﬁnal Convention speech on  Thermidor/ July.
Many historians have regarded his stirring willingness then to visualize and
assume his own death for the res publica as a sincerely suicidal gesture (or else a
 Mignet, Histoire de la Révolution française, pp. –, . See also Leuwers, Robespierre,
pp. –.
 William M. Reddy, ‘Sentimentalism and its erasure: the role of emotions in the era of the
French Revolution’, Journal of Modern History,  (), pp. –; idem, The navigation of
feeling: a framework for the history of emotions (Cambridge, ); David Andress, ‘Living the
Revolutionary melodrama: Robespierre’s sensibility and the construction of political commit-
ment in the French Revolution’, Representations,  (), pp. –.
 Hervé Leuwers, ‘Servir le peuple avec vertu’, in Michel Biard, Philippe Bourdin, Hervé
Leuwers, and Alain Tourret, eds., Vertu et politique: les pratiques des législateurs (–)
(Rennes, ), p. ; Robespierre, Oeuvres, I, p.  (and see also pp. –).
 Robespierre, Oeuvres, IX, pp. , . Other evocations by Robespierre of making the
ultimate sacriﬁce feature passim in his speeches, notably in the months before Thermidor:
see Oeuvres, x, pp. , , –, , .
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symptom of a depressive malaise). More prosaically, however, it may also be
inserted into a long line of similar rhetorical invocations throughout
Robespierre’s political career, particularly – as then – at moments when he was
in a tight political corner. From his initial evocation of the ‘persecutions of
which I am the object’, through his self-description as ‘a slave of liberty, a
living martyr of the Republic’, through to his signing off self-identiﬁcation as ‘a
man who is in the right and who knows how to die for his country’,
Robespierre’s peroration provided an emotionally super-charged casing
around a programme of ﬁerce severity, which would leave no corner of govern-
ment untouched. This extraordinary performance of wounded patriotism won
more hearts in the public tribunes than among the deputies. When he repeated
the speech in the Jacobin Club that evening, there was an upsurge of emotion as
the painter Jacques-Louis David offered to drink hemlock alongside Robespierre
if all failed on the following day. Yet for most deputies, such behaviour had set
the bells of tyranny ringing. Robespierre seemedmore andmore to be following
the Pisistratus script.
Amid the personal score settling and the cascade of raw feeling that
Robespierre unleashed on the Convention in his  Thermidor speech, it is
symptomatic that he found time for swingeing asides aimed at York:
may I be permitted to send back to the Duke of York and all the royal writers the
patents of this ridiculous dignity, which they were the ﬁrst to send to me. When
kings who are not certain of keeping their own crowns assume the right to distribute
them to others, they show too much insolence!
This comment testiﬁed to the extent that the York Declaration six weeks earlier
had hit a nerve. The accusation of aspiring for the throne was something
Robespierre wished to expunge from the record. So was the related charge of
having a personal bodyguard whereby he would be able to seize power, following
the scheming of Pisistratus: as we have seen, Robespierre had long denied the
need for Conventionnels to have personal bodyguards. He was aware that his
enemies could capitalize upon any such move. Indeed, even his categorical
refusal could inspire suspicion rather than trust. Noting his refusal of an armed
guard, the London-based Correspondance politique sneered that ‘demagogues
have always known how to obtain bodyguards, in appearing to refuse them’.
If Robespierre’s ofﬁcial position was unbending opposition to the idea of an
armed guard, his practice seems often to have been at variance with this.
 Among recent biographies, the most emphatic in terms of alleging illness is Peter
McPhee, Robespierre: a Revolutionary life (London, ).
 Aulard, ed., La Société des Jacobins, VI, p. .
 Robespierre, Oeuvres, x, pp. –, see also p. .
 The issue was hot, since a number of représentants en mission in the departments were
accused of abusing their powers by forming bodyguards. For Rousselin, see Horn, Eyewitness
to revolutions.
 Correspondance politique,  June .
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Indeed, on  June , the day after he had reiterated his rejection of York’s
allegation that he had a ‘military guard’, Robespierre acted to increase his
security when working in the CPS’s General Police Bureau, ordering that a
guard (gendarme) be posted at the door to screen visitors. Privately, moreover,
Robespierre appears to have been frequently accompanied on his outings by a
group of men (armed men, at that) in which he was almost alone among dep-
uties in the Convention. On this score too, then, Robespierre seemed to be
performing to Pisistratus type.
Robespierre was a ﬁgure who invited and accepted protection. Even under
the Constituent Assembly, his outspoken attacks on perceived enemies had
put him at risk. Danger to his person during the anti-radical repression that
had followed the Champ de Mars Massacre of July  had been his reason
for moving in as a lodger with master-carpenter and fellow-Jacobin Maurice
Duplay at  Rue Saint-Honoré. The casual intimacy of the ensuing domestic
arrangements (Robespierre was romantically linked to Éléonore Duplay, his
host’s daughter, and he dined and took his leisure with the family) distanced
him from the buzzing and perilous atmosphere of the streets. The women of
the Duplay family, notably Éléonore Duplay and her mother, served as gate-
keepers to Robespierre’s presence, vetting visitors, turning many away, and
keeping an eye out for suspicious characters. Duplay was also at the centre of
a network of business contacts and fellow-Jacobins who formed the nucleus of
an entourage that came to surround Robespierre.
In his Vieux Cordelier, Camille Desmoulins recalled a ﬁgure who had afforded
Robespierre protection in the Revolution’s early years, namely, the printer
Charles-Léopold Nicolas, who lived just down the road from Duplay at 
Rue Saint-Honoré. According to Desmoulins, in those early years Robespierre
was at greater peril ‘than any of us, because his talent and popularity were
more dangerous to the counter-revolutionaries’, and therefore ‘the patriots
did not let him go out alone at all’. Nicolas accompanied Robespierre: ‘big
and strong, armed with a simple stick, [he] was alone worth a troop of royalists
[muscadins]’. Nicolas allegedly retained this role in Year II. In one post-
Thermidorian account, he was cast as being ‘at the head of ﬁfty-odd [sic]
 AN, F . Cited in Aulard, ed., Recueil des actes du Comité de salut public, XIV, pp. –.
The order was signed by Robespierre alone.
 Spy reports on Robespierre’s enemies in the months preceding Thermidor indicate they
were not accompanied or guarded in any way: see Edme Courtois, Rapport fait au nom de la com-
mission chargée de l’examen des papiers trouvés chez Robespierre et ses complices (Paris, An  []),
pp. –.
 For Duplay and his circle, see Stéfane-Pol (i.e. Paul Coutant), Autour de Robespierre: Le con-
ventionnel Le Bas, d’après des documents inédits et les mémoires de sa veuve (Paris, ); Leuwers,
Robespierre, pp. –.
 Le Vieux Cordelier,  Nivôse An  [ Dec. ], p. .
 For Nicolas, see Albert Soboul and Raymonde Monnier, Répertoire du personnel sectionnaire
parisien en l’an II (Paris, ), p. ; Henri Calvet, Un instrument de la Terreur à Paris: le Comité de
salut public ou de surveillance du département de Paris ( juin – messidor) (Paris, ), p. .
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bandits who almost always formed the escort, and so to speak, the bodyguard of
this wretched tyrant’.
Onemay suspect that this descriptionﬁttedRobespierre intoPlutarch’s account
of Pisistratus a little too readily: Plutarch had speciﬁed that Pisistratus’s men,
‘club-bearers’ or korynephori, were ﬁfty in number. Yet even allowing for
Thermidorian exaggeration, Robespierre does appear to have been followed
around by an escort of militant supporters more extensive than Duplay and
Nicolas – six or seven (and never less than two or three) individuals carrying ‘big
sticks or sword canes’ was one more plausible estimate.
Three men later charged with belonging to this group – Jean-Baptiste Didier,
Charles-Louis Châtelet, and Servais-Beaudoin Boulanger – had been involved in
dealingwith the incident atRobespierre’s lodgings onPrairial. After theDuplay
women intercepted Cécile Renault, thesemen took her into custody, conducting
her to the ofﬁces of the Committee of General Security for interrogation. Of
the three, Didier, a journeyman locksmith, supposedly lived in Robespierre’s
lodgings for a period in , before moving to nearby  Rue Saint-Honoré
(which was also Nicolas’s address). Like both Duplay and Nicolas, Didier
became a juryman (juré) on the Revolutionary Tribunal. Although we should
allow for inbuilt Thermidorian bias, he was later alleged to have confessed to
have never voted for any sentence apart from death. Police ﬁles describe him
as frequently armed with a sabre; he also had the distinction of accompanying
Robespierre to the Convention from the Duplay household on the fateful
morning of  Thermidor. Châtelet (or Duchâtelet) was a landscape painter,
who also became a juré. Boulanger went from a career as an apprentice jewel-
ler to National Guard and military service during the Revolution, ultimately
becoming a général de brigade. For reasons which are unclear, Robespierre
offered him patronage and protection, and in the spring of  he was made
aide-de-camp to the Paris National Guard commander, Hanriot, while also
serving as a key henchman for Robespierre.
 BnF, manuscrits, nouvelles acquisitions françaises . Cited in Calvet, Instrument de la
Terreur à Paris, p. .
 Indeed, other accounts indicate that, on occasion at least, it was possible to encounter
Robespierre escorted only by his faithful mastiff, Brount: Charles-Henri Sanson, La
Révolution française vue par son bourreau, ed. Monique Lebailly (Paris, ), pp. –.
 L. Duperron, Vie secrette, politique et curieuse de M. J. Maximilien Robespierre (Paris, An 
[]), p. . A shorter version of this text had appeared in Nouvelles politiques, nationales et
étrangères,  Thermidor An  [ July ].
 AP, XCI, p. .
 AN, F , W . Robespierre’s sister Charlotte claimed that Didier served as her
brother’s secretary: F / (interrogation  Thermidor).
 Soboul and Monnier, Répertoire, p. .
 Ibid., p. ; Calvet, Instrument de la Terreur à Paris, pp. –; Richard Cobb, The people’s
armies: the armées révolutionnaires: instrument of the Terror in the departments, April  to Floréal
Year II, trans. Marianne Elliott (New Haven, CT, and London, ), pp. –; Robespierre,
Oeuvres, x, p. –. Edme-Bonaventure Courtois, the editor of Robespierre’s papers, cited
as members of Robespierre’s ‘escorte’, Nicolas, Garnier Delaunay, Didier, Girard, and
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The individuals allegedly involved in this escort group were card-carrying
Jacobins in the main. Some were demonstrably close to Robespierre, and lived
alongside, or in proximity to him. All were characterized by strong political con-
victions. And a number had used their positions for social and economic as well
as political advancement. Duplay, for example, did well out of the Montagnard
ascendancy, diversifying into property management and also securing major
building contracts, notably for national festivities: on – Thermidor, for
example, his men were hard at work at setting up the seating outside the
Panthéon for a festival in honour of the young patriot martyrs Bara and Viala
which was to be celebrated on  Thermidor – but which was cancelled due
to the events of  Thermidor. Nicolas, for his part, also proﬁted from his per-
sistent attachment to Robespierre. His printing business boomed and he
acquired commissions to publish the Jacobin news-sheet, Journal de la
Montagne, as well as the acts of the Revolutionary Tribunal (on which he was
a juré) and other commissions totalling well over , livres.
Thesemen thus hadmaterial interests as well as political convictions in protect-
ingRobespierre. Even so, onedoes not get the impression – evendiscounting the
vengeful rhetoric of the post-Thermidorian period – that they much resemble
Pisistratus’s ﬁfty-strong club-bearing coup d’état force. Symptomatically, on the
journée of Thermidor, they offered no concerted force and indeed the different
individuals were scattered around the city going about their normal business. We
should not of course underestimate the function of easy sociability that suchmen
offered Robespierre: why should he not be accompanied in the streets by fellow-
Jacobins who lived in his neighbourhood? Nor was the existence of such a group
difﬁcult to explain: Robespierre was the victim of one assassination attempt; he
received other ominous death-threats; he knew he was hated and feared as well
as loved; and he may have been genuinely and understandably frightened. The
radical feminist Claire Lacombe’s testimony following meetings she had with
him in late  is revealing in this respect: she described him as scared that
his days were numbered, with ‘fear written on his face’.
Yet the group of militants brought Robespierre reassurance and security only
at a grave reputational price. The price was that it gave greater credence to the
Pisistratus identity which his political enemies had been fashioning for him for
Châtelet: Courtois, Rapport fait au nom de la commission chargée de l’examen des papiers trouvés chez
Robespierre et ses complices, p.  (Courtois also mentions Taschereau, whose relations with
Robespierre were more complicated). François-Pierre Garnier Delaunay was a career lawyer,
vocal Jacobin, and judge within the Revolutionary Tribunal; Charles-Léopold Renaudin, a
lute-maker, and François Girard, a gold or silversmith (orfèvre). See Soboul and Monnier,
Répertoire, pp. , , .
 AN, Fc I .
 For Nicolas, see Soboul and Monnier, Répertoire, p. ; Calvet, Instrument de la Terreur à
Paris, p. . See too AN, F /, W , and T . For glimpses of his career as a pub-
lisher under the Terror, see too AN, F /, Potier dossier; and Robespierre, Oeuvres, x,
pp.  n. ,  n. .
 AN, F , Lacombe dossier.
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more than a year. Self-sacriﬁcial rhetoric designed to elicit sympathy and
support, popular backing, indeterminate political ambitions, and an armed
force at his beck and call were elements of the Pisistratus script that
Robespierre seemed to be performing. And sure enough, once the storm
broke, the comparison would become explicit. At the climax of the day of dra-
matic action on  Thermidor as Robespierre’s followers sought to rally Paris to
his cause, Barère declared to the Convention that Robespierre was not just
aping Pisistratus, he was outdoing him: ‘Here you see the most atrocious con-
spiracy, a military conspiracy, a conspiracy hatched with a latitude, art and
cold-bloodedness such as were never manifested either by Pisistratus or
Catiline.’ But this Pisistratus did not seize power.
I I I
In this article, we have sought to follow the tangled, triangulated links over the
late spring and summer months between Robespierre, the duke of York, and the
story of the Greek tyrant Pisistratus. Our starting point was the draconian 
Prairial law forbidding the taking of British or Hanoverian prisoners, which,
as our research conﬁrms, was largely unenforced at the front. The mixture
of generous and punitive policies promised by the York Declaration proved a
potent motivation: the French army’s disobedience to their government
sprang not simply from chivalry or humanity, as from a realistic appraisal of
the grim reprisals they risked if themselves taken prisoner. This appraisal by
individual soldiers and their commanders at the front, moreover, was made
in situations far removed from Paris and London. The impact of the political
and governmental wars of words was ﬁltered through the circumstances in
which soldiers found themselves. It would be helpful, we would argue, to
examine the conduct of war with a greater sense of the existence of a zone in
which the two armies exchanged information and rumours as well as shots
and bayonet thrusts.
By bringing into scholarly discussion the text of the York Declaration, repro-
duced here for the ﬁrst time, we have also been able to reassess Robespierre’s
responses to the Declaration in his speeches in the Jacobin Club and the
Convention. While Robespierre was correct in seeing the Declaration as a
Machiavellian ploy by the British commander aimed at detaching French
troops from obedience to their government, we have argued that his compulsive
and combative dwelling on the Declaration sprang from a desire to repulse
accusations of dictatorship which were being retailed about him not simply in
British representations, nor even just behind closed doors within the political
elite, but even inside the ruling CPS (notably by Billaud-Varenne).
 AP, XCIII, p. .
 Note the  Prairial law was extended to Spanish combatants by the Convention decree of
 Thermidor An  [ Aug. ]: AP, XCIV, p. . But it appears to have remained a dead-
letter. Both decrees were repealed on  Nivôse An  [ Dec. ].
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The risks inherent in talkingopenly aboutRobespierre’s putative political ambi-
tionsmeant that suchdiscussionshad tobeconducted largely away fromthepublic
sphere. The fateof theHébertist andDantonist factions in spring showed the
perils of bringing criticisms of Robespierre into the open. Consequently, as we
have argued in this article’s second part, his critics coded their comments,
drawing on their classical heritage. Quizzical references to classical antiquity
could thus – no doubt along with nods and winks and sardonic or stoical smiles –
serve as a formative languageof political opposition.FrenchRevolutionary pol-
itics thus became tangledupwith ancientAthenianhistory in the summerof,
as striking parallels were perceived between Robespierre and the Greek tyrant
Pisistratus: both ‘Montagnards’, it was held, used self-mutilation (though in
Robespierre’s case, this was only linguistic) to secure sympathetic support from
the popular classes and then to cultivate an armed guard designed to seize power.
Yet what also emerges from our discussion of the state of Revolutionary
politics amid these entanglements – transnational as well as transhistorical – is
not simply the growth of opposition to Robespierre under conditions of semi-
clandestinity but the maladroitness of Robespierre’s political behaviour. His
anxiety about the threat that military dictatorship posed to the Revolution was
genuine enough. Yet his over-reaction to the York Declaration rebounded badly
against him by making him seem to be protesting too much. Had he ignored it,
the wholemattermight have beenmerely a footnote to the Franco–Britishmilitary
struggle.Butbymaking suchan issueof it – whenmostofhis listeners knewnothing
about it – he diffused the Declaration very widely, opening up the possibility of a
critique of government policy over the  Prairial prisoners decree that he had
framed. Furthermore, although he obstinately shunned the idea of Convention
deputieshavinganarmedguard,hehimself apparentlywent aroundwith anentou-
rage of armed followers that seemed straight out of the Pisistratus script. It did not
really matter that when one scratches the surface of his ‘armed guard’, they hardly
seem the stuff ofwhicha coupd’étatmight bemade. Itwas the symbolic rather than
the practical aspects of the guard that most irked his fellow-deputies. It suggested
that Robespierre believed himself above the law, and could hypocritically ignore
what he stipulated for others. As we have seen, his acolyte Dumas had declared
that even a ‘guard of friendship’ was unacceptable in a republic. Robespierre
was unable to perceive how his use of an armed escort – informal, occasional,
and small scale as this might have been – was viewed by a political elite steeped
in the culture of antiquity, increasingly inimical towards him, and fearful of his
ambitions. The evidence that emerges from his entanglements with the duke of
York and the Athenian tyrant indicates that in the summer of  Robespierre
really had lost his political touch.
Slyly coded references toRobespierre/Pisistratusdidnot,ﬁnally, ruleout similar
discussions of Robespierre’s allegedwish for supreme power in terms ofmonarchy
 For smiles, see Colin Jones, The smile revolution in eighteenth-century Paris (Oxford, ),
pp. –.
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or dictatorship. Indeed, knowledge of French monarchical and wider ancient
history probably came easier to most Conventionnels. Robespierre/Pisistratus’s
club-bearers/korynephori bore comparison with Rome’s praetorian guard or with
the personal bodyguard of the kings of France. But perhaps such references
were insufﬁciently oblique to avoid attracting suspicion in the tense summer of
; Pisistratus was altogether more apt. Once Robespierre was out of the way,
however, things rapidly changed. References to Pisistratus receded after 
Thermidor. As Bronislaw Baczko has shown, the circumstances of the critical
night of – Thermidor spawned the idea that Robespierre was aiming not for
Athenian tyranny but for French-style kingship. References to Pisistratus were
also increasingly shaded by evocations of the Catiline conspiracy denounced by
Cicero. Tallien, who had led the attack on Robespierre on  Thermidor, encour-
aged this by self-conscious Ciceronian posturing. Ultimately, however, in the post-
Thermidorian viliﬁcation of Robespierre, classical and historical referents were
increasingly displaced by zoomorphic and teratological ones: Robespierre
embodied less an Athenian tyrant, a Roman conspirator, or a French king than
a tiger or a vampire. For most of the nineteenth century, Robespierre would be
ﬁgured not as a failed Pisistratus but rather as a sly, feline, bloodthirsty
monster. As soon as his head fell in the tumbril, one lost sight of the way that
the name of Pisistratus had been used in the months preceding his overthrow as
a stimulus to and rallying-point for opposition, and as a thorn in the ﬂesh of a
Robespierre anxious to cast off a Pisistratus image that he must have realized he
was coming to represent in the eyes of his enemies.
APPENDIX
His Royal Highness the Duke of York, thinks it incumbent on him to announce
to the British and Hannoverian Troops under his Command, that the National
Convention of France, pursuing that gradation of Crimes and Horrors which
 Post-Thermidor Pisistratus references include Audouin’s description, noted above;
Joseph Lakanal, Rapport et projet de loi sur l’organisation des écoles primaires ([Paris], An 
[]), p. ; and idem, Rapport sur les langues orientales, commerciales et diplomatiques, fait au
nom des comités d’instruction publique et des ﬁnances (Paris, An  []), p. . See also AP, XCIV,
pp. , , XCV, p. , XCV, p. , C, p. ; and [François-René de Chateaubriand], Essai
historique, politique et moral, sur les révolutions anciennes et modernes, considérées dans leurs rapports
avec la Révolution françoise (London, []), pp. –.
 Bronislaw Baczko, Ending the Terror: the French Revolution after Robespierre (Cambridge,
), pp. –.
 Colin Jones, ‘Presidential address. French crossings III: the smile of the tiger’,
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society,  (), pp. –; Martin, Robespierre: la fabrication
d’un monstre; Baczko, Ending the Terror; idem, ‘“Comment est fait un tyran…”. Thermidor et
la légende noire de Robespierre’, in Jean Ehrard, ed., Images de Robespierre: actes du colloque inter-
national de Naples, – septembre  (Naples, ), pp. –.
 TNA, WO /, fos. – (annexed to a letter from Craig to Nepean,  June ,
fos. –).
 CO L I N J O N E S A N D S I MON M A C DON A L D
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X17000267
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 82.8.191.244, on 19 Jan 2018 at 07:48:38, subject to the Cambridge Core
has distinguished the period of its Government as the most calamitous of any
that has yet occurred in the History of the World, has just passed a Decree,
that their Soldiers shall give no Quarter to the British and Hannoverian
Troops –
His Royal Highness anticipates the indignation & horror which will naturally
arise in the Minds of the Brave Troops whom he addresses upon receiving this
information – His Royal Highness desires however to remind them, that mercy
to the vanquished is the Brightest Gem in a Soldier’s character, and he exhorts
them, not to Suffer their resentment to lead to any precipitate act of cruelty on
their part which may sully the reputation they have acquired in the World –
His Royal Highness believes that it will be difﬁcult for brave Men to conceive,
that any set of Men who are themselves exempt from sharing in the dangers of
War, should be so base and Cowardly as to seek to aggravate the calamities of it
upon the unfortunate people who are subject to their orders – It was indeed
reserved for the present times to produce to the World the prooff of the possi-
bility of the existence of such atrocity & Infamy – The pretence for Issuing this
Decree even if founded in Truth could justify it only to Minds similar to those of
the Members of the National Convention, but is in fact too absurd to be
Noticed, and still more to be refuted – The French must themselves see
through the ﬂimsy artiﬁce of a pretended assassination by which Robespierre
has succeeded in procuring that Military Guard which has at once estab-
lished him the successor of the unfortunate Louis, by whatever Name he may
choose to dignify his future Reign –
In all thewarswhich fromtheearliest timeshaveexistedbetween theBritish and
FrenchNations, they have been accustomed to consider each other in theLight of
Generous as well as brave enemies, while theHannoverians for a century the allies
of the Former have shared in this reciprocal esteem – Humanity and kindness
have at all times taken place the instant that opposition has ceased, and the
sameCloak has frequently been seen coveringwounded Enemies while indiscrim-
inately conveying to the Hospitals of the Conqueror. – The British and
Hannoverian armies will not believe that the French Nation, even under their
present infatuation, can so far forget their characters as Soldiers, as to pay any
attention to a Decree as injurious to themselves, as it is disgraceful to the
persons who passed it – In this conﬁdence His Royal Highness trusts, that the
Soldiers of both Nations will conﬁne their sentiments of resentment and abhor-
ence to the National Convention alone, persuaded that they will be joined in
them by every Frenchman, who possesses one spark of Honor or one principle
of a soldier andHisRoyalHighness is conﬁdent, that it will only beonﬁnding, con-
trary to every expectation that the French army has relinquished every Title to the
fair character of Soldiers and ofMen, by submitting to andobeying so atrocious an
Order, that the Brave Troops under his command, will think themselves Justiﬁed
 Above the words ‘procuring that Military Guard’ there is an interlining in pencil,
‘consolidating that dictatoral [sic] Power’.
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and indeed under the necessity of themselves adopting a Species of Warfare, for
which they will stand acquitted to their own Consciences, to their Country, and
to the World – In such an event, the French army alone will be answerable for
the Tenfold Vengeance which will fall upon themselves their Wives and their
Children, and their unfortunate Country, already groaning under every calamity
which the accumulated crimes of unprincipled ambition and avarice can heap
upon their devoted Victims
His Royal Highness desires that these orders may be read and Explained to
the Men at Three successive Roll callings –
Head Quarters Tournay
th June 
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